This paper describes the Cyber Security Game (CSG). Cyber Security Game is a method that has been implemented in software that quantitatively identifies cyber security risks and uses this metric to determine the optimal employment of security methods for any given investment level. Cyber Security Game maximizes a system's ability to operate in today's contested cyber environment by minimizing its mission risk. The risk score is calculated by using a mission impact model to compute the consequences of cyber incidents and combining that with the likelihood that attacks will succeed. The likelihood of attacks succeeding is computed by applying a threat model to a system topology model and defender model. Cyber Security Game takes into account the widespread interconnectedness of cyber systems, where defenders must defend all multi-step attack paths and an attacker only needs one to succeed. It employs a game theoretic solution using a game formulation that identifies defense strategies to minimize the maximum cyber risk (MiniMax). This paper discusses the methods and models that compose Cyber Security Game . A limited example of a Point of Sale system is used to provide specific demonstrations of Cyber Security Game models and analyses.
Introduction
Protecting Information and Communication Technology (ICT) systems from cyber-attacks or reducing the impacts that cyber incidents cause (i.e., cyber security and resilience) is a topic of national importance. ICT systems are now ubiquitous in all aspects of our society. With an ability to create ICT incident effects via cyberspace, criminals can steal and extort money or information, terrorists can disrupt society or cause loss of life, and the effectiveness of a military can be degraded. These threats have caused an imperative to minimize a system's cyber security risk.
We address this need by applying a software-based method called the Cyber Security Game (CSG) to systems in order to maximize their cyber security for any given investment level. CSG 1,2 is a methodology that uses game theory to identify and reduce a system's cyber risk, given an operational (i.e., mission) context. CSG can be used to determine the most cost-effective employment of defense methods to protect an ICT system, producing security portfolios that are Pareto optimal against quantitative cyber risk and investment costs. These optimal security portfolios allow defenders to select the set of methods that best reduces the cyber risks given an investment level. This provides an indication of the return on investment for cyber security.
CSG takes a holistic view of how a system fulfils its intended purpose. This requires understanding the purpose, the entire range of hazards, and all possible attacks. Additionally, CSG models the attacker's response to any defensive measures, since for every action a defender makes to improve a system's security, a sophisticated attacker will make a corresponding adjustment to select the next most promising attack.
This paper describes CSG's method. A limited example of a Point of Sale (PoS) system is used to provide specific demonstrations of CSG models and analyses. The outline of this paper is as follows. First, we discuss the challenges in modeling cyber security. Next, we describe the CSG methodology. Then, we demonstrate the application of CSG to PoS. Finally, we conclude the paper with thoughts and discussion on CSG.
Addressing the challenges in the modeling and analysis of cybersecurity
Applying modeling and analysis to cyber security faces a multitude of challenges. First, one is challenged by the nebulous objectives of improving cyber security and how to measure any improvements. Therefore, these objectives must be quantified. Second, one must comprehensively ensure to consider the potential impacts of the staggering number of exploits and cyber-attack methods (e.g., Common vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) has over 75,000 entries and Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) enumerates over 500 attack patterns 3 ). Third, it is necessary to account for numerous attack paths, and consider that an attacker can compromise multiple components at one time and can exploit seemingly non-critical cyber components as a way to bypass security controls and other defenses (e.g., Stuxnet 4 and Target data breach 5 ). Fourth, one must account for the behavior of an attacker, since for every action a defender makes to improve a system's security, an attacker will make a corresponding action to select the next most promising attack. Finally, cyber security investments must be made in the face of resource limitations, so it is necessary to determine in which tools/methods to invest and where to apply them given such constraints. These challenges are discussed in the following sections accompanied by the manner in which CSG addresses them.
Quantifying cyber risk
The National Bureau of Standards published 6 one of the early documents to discusses cyber risk analysis and introduce the concept of the damage (loss) caused by an unfavorable event and an estimate of how often the event may happen in a period of time (likelihood). Despite this, industry practice followed a path of ''best practice'' and qualitative assessment. Soo Hoo 7 highlighted some shortcomings of qualitative approaches and put some decision analysis rigor to information assurance modeling by creating a probabilistic risk model using influence diagrams and an annual loss expectancy model. Mission Oriented Risk and Design Analysis (MORDA) is a methodology for analyzing security risks. 8 MORDA combines threats, attack trees, and mission impact concepts for deriving an unbiased risk metric. However, their modeling process requires significant interactions with several small and Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) and manual development of attack trees. As concluded by an U.S. National Research Council (NRC) study, however, attack trees are less useful for assessing the risks posted by intelligent, adaptive adversaries. 9 Merrick and Parnell 10 show that attack trees and decision trees that specify assumed/fixed probabilities for attacker decisions consistently underestimate the defender risks. In particular, they do not show the shift in risk given the potential defender decisions. Finally, Anderson 11 points out that cyber security is impacted by more than just the technical measures selected to secure the organization (e.g., governance, training). Our focus, so far, however, has been primarily on the technical elements.
Many people follow, 12 often using simplified models, that rely on the definition ''Risk = Threat (T) × Vulnerability (V) × Consequence (C).'' Subject matter experts assess the threat and vulnerability terms as probabilities. The consequence term is assessed in a variety of units (e.g., economic replacement cost, fatalities). The notion is to assess adversary intent as ''threat'' 13 and then rely on such assessments to optimize defense.
14 Some, however, have raised concerns about adversarial risk models based on (T,V,C). Cox 15 illustrates examples of how (T,V,C) models can render nonsensical advice. Cox 16 further notes the deficiency of T, V, and C values as inputs when the probabilities are correlated, and also points out that because the values for V and C really depend on the amount of effort expended by both the attacker and defender, it is not sensible to treat them as independent inputs. 17 CSG's method is motivated by Cox's arguments.
An important aspect of CSG's method is that it focuses on defending threats to operational outcomes, not just defending against individual risks. CSG defines individual incident risk as the product of the probability that a cyber incident will occur (i.e., P CI ) and the expected loss incurred from the incident (i.e., L CI ). CSG then defines the total system risk (TSR) as the summation of all the incident risks associated with the possible set of incidents that an attacker can cause, as shown in Equation (1). 18 However, a risk-averse decision maker may choose to focus on the worst-case risk scenario, identified by Equation (2) . Both treatments of system risk are represented in CSG:
The expression shown Equation (1) representing the TSR is used in the interest of simplicity. Its use can produce a numerical result that is very slightly larger in value (i.e., pessimistic) when compared to an exact solution. The calculated TSR value is a rough and fast approximation of the risks to a system. A reason for this is the assumption that all the risks of incidents in the sum are independent of each other: where increasing one risk does not affect the total system risk more than the local increase. Independence assumptions hold in CSG since it considers the risks of both compromising individual components, as well as compromising combinations of components (up to some threshold number of concurrent component compromises, above which are assumed to be rare events). Such substitutions, often used in system safety practice, are known as ''rare event approximations. '' 19 In the cyber context of facing an intelligent attacker, an attacker may compromise multiple components to create a desired impact (i.e., a defender loss). Therefore, methods that look only at the risk of attacking single component at a time can fail to identify critical scenarios. Moreover, the vulnerabilities associated with attacking multiple components are rarely independent of each other (i.e., the same exploit may be effective against multiple components of the same type). Therefore, the risks associated with having components all of the same type are not the same as the risks of having diverse components. Methods that fail to take such interdependencies into account, can mislead and support poor decision making. 15 
Comprehensive assessment of cyber incidents
In cyber security, the vast number of attacker exploits and methods that are possible can be daunting to consider. Some attacks may be opportunistic, and some may be targeted. 20 Many cyber security risk assessment methods focus on a systems susceptibility to known exploits, 21 rather than to best withstand zero-day attacks. In CSG we are more interested in assessing whether good security principles have been applied (i.e., least privilege, segmentation, diversity, etc.) and whether defenses are employed to make it as difficult for the attacker as possible.
Given the vast number of attack methods, cyber modeling is faced with the difficult question of how to comprehensively reason about all of the cyber incident instances that are possible. Others have addressed this problem by reasoning about cyber incident effects 22, 23 rather than all of the attack instances that can produce those effects. It is common to consider Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) cyber incident effects, but in CSG we use the cyber incident effects defined in the DIMFUI taxonomy 24 as a more comprehensive set of incident effects, where every entry in CVE manifests itself as one or more of these effects against one or more of the system's cyber resources.
Degradation: An attacker causes a reduction in the performance of an IT resource of the system. Examples of degradation are reduced network bandwidth, a computer that runs slower, or the lower quality of some piece of information.
Interruption: An attacker causes an information asset of the system to become unusable, unavailable. Interruption can be thought of as complete degradation.
Modification: An attacker causes a change in the data, protocol, software, or hardware of an IT resource.
Fabrication: An attacker inserts false information or components into a system. Examples are counterfeit hardware or software that can perform unexpected activities.
Unauthorized Use: An attacker uses system resources for illegitimate purposes.
Interception: An attacker gains unauthorized access to information or assets. An example is an attacker finding credit card in the memory of a computer.
The occurrence of incident effects can then lead to incident impacts. There are a wide variety of ways to compute impacts (e.g., Bayesian Networks, 22 Influence Diagrams, 25 Dependency graphs with rollup rules, 23, 26 and Process Models. 2, 27, 28 However, one must be aware of various factors that relate to computing impacts. First, impacts can be different depending on the type of cyber incident effect. For example, an interruption of an ICT resource may lead to minor losses, whereas the modification of that same resource could lead to catastrophic losses. Impact methods should account for the fact that the mission outcome relationships may be different for each incident type. However, many dependency tree-based approaches either focus on availability 26 or assume that a single combined incident affect dependency link is sufficient. 23 A single dependency is rarely appropriate across all incident effects. Consider, for example, a compromise on the location of a downed pilot. If the location data are unavailable, they will delay rescue activities that need them and reduce the chance of recovery. By contrast, if the location's confidentiality is compromised, all activities associated with a rescue mission may complete correctly, yet the mission can still fail because the enemy was able to use the intercepted location to reach the pilot first or reach the pilot first and then set ambush. Here, the relationship of location interruption is to the outcome of a mission task, whereas the location confidentiality relates directly to the overall mission outcome.
Secondly, impact can depend on incident timing, incident duration, and whether impacts are immediate or delayed. For example, an incident affecting an ICT resource after it is no longer needed, causes no impact. A longer duration incident or ones that take longer to recover often causes more impacts than incidents with shorter duration. Impacts may also be delayed, not occurring at the time of an incident. Additionally, they may stem from follow-on cascading effects that propagate through a system and cause impacts elsewhere in the mission. It is difficult for dependency tree, Bayesian network, and Influence Diagrams methods to account for such factors. This matters if one wants a coherent treatment of catastrophic impacts that are time sensitive versus minor impacts that can occur at any time.
Thirdly, system risks and hence, risk assessments can change over time (i.e., a new vulnerability is discovered, or the system or mission is modified). If these ''changing'' system characteristics are modeled only implicitly, it is much harder to maintain and update the risk assessment as things change. Methods such as RiskMap 23 represent risk dependencies as a roll-up dependency weight that combines both probability and impact into a single value. Keeping track of how much of a weight comes from impact and how much is incident probability make the models hard to comprehend, validate, and maintain over time.
Cyber Mission Impact Assessment (CMIA) 2, 27 and Analyzing Mission Impacts of Cyber Actions (AMICA) 28 are the only cyber impact assessment methods we are aware of that accommodate all of these factors. AMICA and CMIA both follow the method in Musman et al. 29 for computing impacts. The CMIA method will be discussed later in this paper.
Modeling attack paths
Since the cyber security defender faces an intelligent adversary, they must be able to identify and defend against multi-step attacks. Owing to the interconnectedness of cyber systems, attackers can exploit seemingly non-critical cyber components as a way to bypass security controls and other defenses (e.g., Stuxnet 4 and Target data breach 5 ). There is a need to consider how combinations of incidents and non-critical system IT components contribute to risks. An individual incident may cause no impact on its own but can act as stepping stones for follow-on attacks. Many risk assessment methods 26, 30 either fail to consider these non-critical ICT resources or model them implicitly.
A popular way to identify attack paths and model attacker behavior is via attack trees. Often these are developed manually, 8 but this is an area where automation can compute them using system topology models. The typical application of topology models focuses on Topological Vulnerability Analysis (TVA). 21 TVA identifies how known, existing vulnerabilities affect attacker pathways to a specific target component. The approach was generalized in the work of Lingyu et al. 31 to compute a system metric called k zero-day safety. This metric counts the number of unique exploits that would be needed to reach a target. CSG generalizes this approach even further by using a probabilistic attacker model and considering all of the potential impact targets an attacker may be able to subvert.
Modeling attacker behavior
Another complicating factor in cyber security defense is that for every action a defender makes to improve a system's security, an attacker will make a corresponding adjustment to find the next most promising attack. Attack trees capture how an attacker will explore multiple options to circumvent defenses, but do not reflect how the tree is affected by defender actions. To address this characteristic, cyber-attacks and the concomitant defensive actions that can prevent them can be viewed as game playing between two players. 32 Despite this, few risk management methods include attacker and defender steps to evaluate defender actions. Those that do, focus on: optimizing a specific defense method, 33 don't look across multiple methods, 34 or have unspecified ways that they relate the payoff of attacks (i.e., a mission impact model is assumed).
35,36
Cavusoglu et al. 37 compare decision-theoretic and gametheoretic approaches to IT security investment, focusing on a firm and a hacker. Kunreuther and Heal 38 on the other hand, consider game theory for interdependent security, but their decisions are discrete, that is, whether to invest or not. CSG generalizes attacker behavior by applying a game-theoretic approach based on the constraints that the system structure and defenses place on the attacker.
Identifying the best investments
Gordon and Loeb 39 produced one of the most cited papers on the economics of security investment. They compute a marginal rate of return on investment, focusing on threat reduction. Their model is somewhat simplified and highlevel, based on a value at risk loss, threat and vulnerability (T,V,C). Here, loss is to an asset, or a conglomeration of assets. Compound threats leading to dependent losses would be combined to a single threat value, and their method focuses on the reducing vulnerability. The method, however, knows nothing about the cyber components themselves, so it cannot do the following: the method can't identify pathways by which an attacker might access the asset; the method can't explicitly reason about diversifying components or reducing privilege; finally, the method does not consider any attacker responses to the deployment of defenses.
There are also currently a number of existing cyber risk methods that focus on allocating resources by the risk ranking of critical cyber resource s or producing a top 10 list of risks to the system. Unfortunately, risk rankings are not adequate for resource allocation. This rack-n-stack approach can lead to poor results. 16 Greedy allocation schemes are also known to be suboptimal, 40 and individual asset risks may not be independent of each other. Just as important, ranked risks are missing critical information: how the attacker adapts in the face of defender actions. The best defenses to employ, and where to employ them, vary greatly depending on the defenders' resource level. CSG includes a portfolio engine in order to best identify investments given resource constraints.
The Cyber Security Game
CSG addresses the challenges described above. CSG is algorithmic, using models to describe the system, the threat environment, and defender capabilities. It runs algorithms on those models to produce results. CSG automates a number of expert level capabilities (such as attack path discovery and portfolio analysis), so defenders do not have do them manually. When aspects of the system, defenses, or threats change (i.e., new vulnerabilities are discovered), a defender can update the appropriate model that is affected by the change and rerun CSG to assess the new conditions. CSG is designed for system level analysis to inform decision makers of good security design principles, targeted improvement, cost effective risk reduction investments, and where defenses should be deployed. An overview of CSG is provided here.
CSG is not intended for macro level analysis. CSG is novel in its explicit representation and tying together of the impact on a mission process, system topology, access/trust relationships, and component type information into a mathematical function. Its mathematical model considers how the attacker is affected by system configuration. CSG's attacker model uses factors such as the network topology, access relationships and component type information. This essentially replaces the threat and vulnerability components of the commonly used in the (T,V,C) that is used in many risk formulations 39 and criticized by Cox, 15 with something that handles any interdependencies of T & V.
The optimization context for CSG comes from a CMIA model that describes the cyber impacts associated when using a system for a specific purpose (a use-case scenario or mission thread). CSG's searches through the combinatorics of possible cyber incidents, attack paths, impacts, and defender method employments. CSG is formulated as a two-person zero-sum game (where both attacker and defender assign the same value to gain or loss). As such it implements a rational approach to cyber security decision making, where both players play to the best of their ability and work to best counteract each other's moves. CSG optimizes its decision assuming that the attacker knows (or can eventually find out) everything about the system they are attacking. The ''game'' played in CSG is essentially one where a defender player configures and sets defenses in their system. Then the attacker player assumes that the system has no known vulnerabilities and assesses how difficult it would be for them to compromise components that would cause the biggest impacts. The game proceeds by allowing the defender player to reconfigure or employ additional defenses, and is once again followed by having attacker player reassess the difficulty of causing impacts given those changes. This is a different game than one might consider when trying to defend a system in real-time in the face of detected attacker activity. Methods for trying to deceive, delay, or deter an attacker over the short term would motivate a different game formulation. Different formulations are shown in Roy et al. 32 The system metric in CSG is the system risk score defined in Equation (1) (or Equation (2) depending on defender risk preference). For each state of the game the attacker player generates an attack tree (that looks multiple compromises ahead) to identify the impacts they can cause. The leaf nodes of the attack tree provide the impacts and the probabilities used in Equation (1), the risk score. MiniMax is used to explore how each defender method can best reduce the risk score. Since the employment of defenses incur a cost, the game is over under two conditions. The first is when the game identifies the optimal set of defense methods to use when the defender has spent the amount of money they have allocated. The second is when a complete portfolio analysis is performed to compute the Pareto frontier for each price point. Figure 1 demonstrates CSG's output, plotting the cost and performance of each portfolio option. The dots on the lower border show the Pareto optimal portfolios. This particular system had a nominal cyber risk of 12.15 when no defensive methods were used. CSG reveals, that the risk can be reduced to 3.12 by using all of the defense methods and investing $240,000. However, an investment of only $50,000 can reduce the risk score to 3.97. This illustrates that for this system 90% of the best possible risk reduction can be obtained at 20% of the cost of that maximum reduction.
CSG uses several different models to accomplish this and computes with them algorithmically. CSG includes three models. A CMIA process model that is used to compute impacts. A system topology model describes the component interconnectivity and trust relationships. CSG also contains a built-in default attacker model. Each of these models will be described below.
Modeling incident impacts
CSG uses a CMIA process model 27 to determine the consequence (losses) incurred from cyber incidents (i.e., L CI from Equation (1)). CMIA is available as a tool 2 making it possible to capture mission details as an executable simulation. It models mission activities, ICT activities, activity durations, activity dependencies, ICT resources, time constraints, and control flows. CMIA relates these factors to mission outcomes in the form of mission impacts. CMIA applies DIMFUI effects against the ICT resources to determine the consequence of the effect. CMIA process models can be probabilistic and stochastic, allowing one to bound the uncertainties associated with the model. Running combinatorics on the set of cyber incident effects against all of the system's ICT resources allows the model's impacts and criticality estimates to be validated by mission subject matter experts 41 and enables CSG to run through all the possible cyber incident effects to identify the impacts that will be assessed using MiniMax. 2 The impacts that are part of a CMIA model, should be associated with mission outcomes that should not be allowed to occur (e.g., human death), or which should be avoided if at all possible. If there is uncertainty with parameters or impacts they can be represented at distributions. This makes it possible to identify the bounds associated with the uncertainty (similar to the presentation of loss probability in VAR models 42, 43 ). Before running in CSG, however, we recommend that users decide where they are willing to be on the impact distribution curve (i.e., which level of impacts are unacceptable).
CMIA models contain process models of ICT related activity. The ICT-Level models are developed by defining the ICT activities and interconnected process associated with the ICT resources (components). Examples of ICT resources are hardware, software, and data. An ICT process is the set of activities that rely on ICT resources that must be performed to support some mission task. These ICT processes are usually derived by tracing task related ICT dependencies on a network diagram. Each ICT resource on that path must perform an activity for the mission task to succeed. Each ICT activity is then assigned to the impacts that would be caused if it were affected by each of the different DIMFUI cyber effects. Figure 2 illustrates how the CMIA tool captures mission sequencing and control flow relationships as a Business Process Modeling Notation (BPMN) diagram. Additionally, it shows some of the underlying details that turn it into an executable simulation. For more information on the CMIA method and tool see Musman and Temin 2 and Musman et al. 27 
Modeling the attacker
CSG, uses a default attacker model that can be used by the game. The attack model defines the probability that attacks will succeed given the topological constraints that the system imparts on the attacker. In order for the attacker to affect ICT resources that can cause significant impacts, the attacker must find a pathway to access them. The attack model specifies two points of entry for an attacker. Attackers can try and enter from the internet or be a malicious inside user. From either entry point, the attacker can then move through the network to reach ICT Resources that can cause impact. The attacker model characterizes the ability of an attacker to move through the network as a series of attack steps each with a probability of succeeding. The attack model conditions the probability of an attack succeeding with the following characteristics:
-whether the attacker is trying to compromise a component they can directly connect to (i.e., inside the network they are already in), or whether it is one in another network that requires crossing a network boundary to access; -whether that component is the same type as a component already compromised; -whether a component is known to be vulnerable to known exploits that a current attacker is likely to possess; -whether the component is a server that contains one or more network services; -whether user roles, who have access to each resource, can leverage those roles to access other components in the network to create impacts. Figure 3 shows example probabilities of attacker success for a topology. The diagram shows how the topology affects an attacker assuming that they first try and attack host Win 7-2 before attacking something else. The diagram shows that the client host, Win 7-2, can become successfully compromised by an attacker from outside the network with probability P SjOIC ð Þ. S is defined as a successful compromise and OIC refers to the attackers Outside trying to get In by attacking a Client situation. If the attacked host is a server then P SjOIS ð Þwould be used as the probability of success. The client host, Win 7-2, can also become compromised by a malicious insider with Inside Access (IA) with probability N × P SjIA ð Þ, where the N represents the number of users that have access and does not exceed 1.0. Once host Win 7-2 is compromised, the attacker Has Access (HA) and so applications or data that are on that host can be compromised with probability P SjHA ð Þ. Because Host Win 7-1 is the Same Type of Client (STC) as Win 7-2, the same exploit used to compromise Win 7-2 has a high chance of also being able to compromise Win 7-1 with probability P(S | STC). Since the Linux host is a client computer of a Different Type of Client (DTC) than Win 7-1, it will have a different chance of success, P SjDTC ð Þ. Server A will use the P SjDTS ð Þ probability, because it is a different type of host than Win 7-2 and since it is a server, servers have network services that could be exploited.
The probability of successfully navigating the network and compromising components is computed using the chain rule. This attacker model can be composed across multiple networks, trust, and segmentation boundaries. This attacker model captures the basic security properties of segmentation, diversity, and least privilege:
Modeling system topology and applying the attack model
To estimate risk, CSG needs to estimate the probability that the impacts will occur given the constraints of the system topology. Therefore, it needs a topology model. The topology model represents the interconnection of ICT resources in the system. These include cyber components, applications, data, user account groups, and firewalls or access controls that implement trust relationships. Items in the topology model include single ICT resources as well as ICT resource pools that represent functionally identical groupings of resources of the same type. The system topology model requires resource type information for each ICT resource, and uses this to estimate when the same attacker exploit from an earlier step might be reused. The existence of connections, firewall rules, and the access of user roles define connectivity capabilities and restrictions between ICT resources. An example of a topology model is shown later in this paper. The topology model makes it possible to automate computing an attack tree. This process is illustrated in Figure 4 . The figure illustrates some of the complications that exist, even for analyzing a simple four-host system (top left). All of the mission impacts in the figure (lower left) would be computed with a CMIA model. Those impacts include impacts from when multiple components are compromised. Even though the model in the figure contains only two subnets, the model represents a trust relationship from S1 and S2 to S4. The attack tree is then generated, using the attacker model to estimate the probability of each attack step succeeding. As seen, the two right branches on the attack tree include compromising host S2 even though it causes no impacts, since it might be a useful stepping-stone to reach other nodes.
In Figure 4 only the attack steps from the internet are part of the final attack tree. This is because rational attackers will always use the optimal path to compromise a component in the system. Since we are evaluating risks in the context of MiniMax and since the compromise of insider accounts is less likely to succeed than the attacks from the internet, they are pruned from this tree. Even so, this small example produces a more expansive attack tree than we can fully illustrate in the figure (only some of the tree pathways are shown). At the end of each path in the attack tree an expected value is computed (based on the worst-case impact that is possible and the probability of traversing the steps in the attack path). In generating the attack tree, it is necessary to consider different pathways to achieve the same impacts. This is because trust relationships (i.e., as imposed by firewall rules) are not necessarily directionally symmetric, and each pathway can have a different probability of success.
Because an attacker may have to compromise multiple ICT resources to cause impacts one must look enough steps ahead to identify those cases. Looking only a single attacker step ahead can fail to identify many critical scenarios. In CSG this number of attack steps to explore is a parameter than can be set. Usually, unless a system is composed of particularly layered defensive boundaries, looking at 3-4 steps ahead is sufficient for most systems.
Computing the risk score
The attack tree created by exploring pathways contains the information required to produce the risk score with Equation (1) . Every branch of the tree represents a unique attacker option. Every leaf node in the tree represents an expected value (EV) of defender loss if the attacker pursues that option. The EV is a combination of the impact (loss) caused by compromise(s) and the probability of performing all of the steps to create the compromise. The probability of performing all of the steps stems from the application of the chain rule on the probability of completing each step in the branch. A defender playing the game gets credit for reducing those risks. 18 Risk-averse defenders may focus on the worst case risk in the tree, using Equation (2), since some defenses may work to reduce the total risk, but do nothing to reduce the worst-case risk in the tree (as reflected in Equation (2)). Each risk equation may end up needing a different defensive portfolio to optimally defend against it.
Modeling defender methods
In order to be able to assess defender choices CSG requires models of the defense methods that can be employed. These are shown in Figure 5 . Some of the defenses focus on reducing the likelihood of incidents succeeding. This is typically accomplished in one of two ways. One way is to protect the cyber resources themselves, and the other is to change access. Each defense method requires an assessment of how well the method is expected to work to prevent different cyber incident effects from occurring. Methods that reduce the chance of attack success are shown in the table in Figure 5 . The table lists: the method category, the method name, the specific ICT resources it is assigned to protect, the purpose of the method, cost estimates for employing the method, and method effectiveness assessment. This effectiveness assessment is specified as a score from 0 to 100. A 0 means that the method is of no use to prevent the effect, and a score of 100 means it stops all of the attacks that would cause that effect. The interpretation is that a score of 40 should imply that 40% of the attacker exploits that we expect or anticipate as possible would no longer succeed.
Some other defender methods can be represented by changes to the CMIA process model. The bottom left of Figure 5 shows how incorporating a redundant server can be represented in the process model. Including a redundant server introduces a redundant process path. An incident affecting only the original server causes no impact. However, since CSG looks multiple attacker steps ahead it will eventually identify the attacker scenario that compromises both servers. Based on the threat model, however, the likelihood of an attacker to be able to compromise both is lower than compromising only one, resulting in a lower mission risk.
Other defensive actions can be represented in the topology model. The likelihood that attacks will succeed can be reduced by changing the network topology or changing access controls (e.g., see bottom right of Figure 5 ). Risks can also be reduced by reducing the number of pooled resources (i.e., client workstations or users) with access. Lastly, the risks can be reduced by diversifying the components in the system so the same attack cannot be reused on them.
Defenses can be modeled in CSG can apply across the entire attack lifecycle. These can range from activities such as employee background checks which reduces the chances that an attacker becoming an employee with insider access, to response methods that recover a compromised component back to an operational state in a mission compatible timeframe.
An example of applying CSG to a point of sale system
This section presents an abridged description of a system assessment performed for our customer. A more detailed description of the model and results is available in Turner and Musman. 44, 45 This description of applying CSG is to describe to the reader how CSG has been applied rather than encompass model details required for reproduction.
We modeled a PoS system that had been implemented in a MITRE lab. Most of the time and effort in modeling a system is related to developing and validating the CMIA model. Running the software itself takes hours. It can take weeks to months to develop the CMIA model. Most of the development time is spent on a task common to all risk modeling efforts, understanding the system use in the context of its purpose. Once the modeler(s) understands the system, developing the model is straightforward (as described below), and proceeds quickly over hours or days. Validation of the CMIA model is also time consuming and is accomplished in two ways. First, SMEs can be used to review the model and its outputs. Second, sensitivity analysis can be performed that focuses on the model parameters that have uncertainty. CMIA models can use point estimates of parameters, or assign distributions to them and run the model stochastically.
The development of the topology model is also straight forward, requiring only a network diagram, an understanding of user access characteristics, and access controls. Modeling the defense methods currently involves interaction with cyber security experts to capture their expectations on which incident effects a defense protects against. CSG currently only models these expectations as point probabilities, but they could be distributions if desired. It is more important for the modeler to get the relative performance of each defense as it compares to the other defenses correct, than it is for them to be calibrated in reality. We usually recommend performing a sensitivity analysis on the output to identify rank reversals, and tipping points. 46 The modeled PoS system represents a basic merchant configuration and a test account with a processor. It executes the authorization process, enabling interested parties to run experiments and assess cyber security solutions for the merchant. The implemented system focuses on the merchant; therefore, the roles of processor, acquirer, and issuer were not included in the CSG model. A diagram of the lab setup is shown in Figure 6 .
Developing the CMIA process model for PoS
The development of a CMIA model can be decomposed into three primary steps: Model High Level Processes, Model Cyber Impacts, and Model ICT-Level Processes. Like most modeling processes, CMIA is iterative. Each step has to be revisited to ensure consistency and completeness of the model. A visual overview of these steps is shown in Figure 7 .
The first step in building a CMIA model is to describe the process flow of high-level activities. These activities are usually an aggregation of several other lower level activities and ICT resources. The top-level process associated with PoS transactions is shown in CreditCards.com. 47 ICT resources are not usually present in the high-level process. The next step builds the impact model. Typically, six to twelve adverse impacts are identified that can be caused by a cyber-attack. These impacts are then modeled with the appropriate catch objects, executable code that is executed as the simulation runs with a cyber effect, and variables that account for the loss due to the impact. Incidents can also include temporal effects where an inability to perform actions in a timely manner can lead to impacts. Here, we considered purchase transactions that take too long. A pathway was added to the top-level model reflecting that if it takes longer than 2 min to complete the transaction, the customer will get fed up and walk away. Careful consideration was given in the model for the impacts of incidents that can occur simultaneously.
The PoS model included the following impact outcomes of cyber incidents: ''Lost Customer Card Record,''''Merchant Loss of Customer Records,''''Lost Purchase,''''An Illegal Purchase,'' and ''Multiple Illegal Purchases.'' As an example to the reader on how losses are estimated, we consider the loss of an individual customer record and the loss of all customer records. Based on a 2015 Verizon report, an individual loss of customer data costs a merchant 201 USD. 48 When companies lose a large number of records the cost is approximated as 3618:2 × NumRecords 0:4236 USD. 48 We assume for the PoS model that the merchant is of moderate size, and a data breach would result in 1000 records resulting in ã 65k USD loss.
In our PoS system this ICT activity is as follows: A credit card is swiped and read by a card reader. The ICT activity is ''read card data.'' The ICT resource is a ''card reader.'' When the card reader is subjected to Interruption, Modification, and Fabrication cyber incident effects impacts can occur. Interruption can lead to the impact ''Lost Purchase'' for the merchant. Modification and Fabrication can lead to the impact ''Lost Customer Data.'' The complete CMIA PoS process model is shown in Figure 8 .
The completed CMIA model for PoS makes it possible to estimate the impact of cyber incidents. An incident is the creation of a DIMFUI effect on a cyber resource that starts at some time (possibly unknown), and lasts for some duration (possibly unknown). This impact reflects the occurrence of the incident, not what caused it, nor how probable it is. Since it is impossible to know a priori when an incident will occur, and how long it might last for, CMIA makes it possible to run incident combinatorics on each cyber resource, of each incident effect, when it starts and how long it lasts. This allows us to estimate the criticality of each cyber resource. Results are shown in Figure 9 . This graph shows the magnitude of impacts that can be caused by compromising each cyber resource, and also which incident effects can cause those impacts. In the hands of a cyber security engineer this helps them determine which defense methods are most appropriate to employ. 
Developing the topology model
The PoS topology model is shown in Figure 10 , where topology diagram ovals represent a cyber resource, triple ovals represent a pool of identical cyber resources, and triple squares represent a group of users who are allowed access to the ICT resources. The topology model captures hosts, applications, and data. It also captures where they sit on the network, along with component type and connectivity trust relationships (even though these last two are not shown in Figure 10 ).
Every ICT resource used in the CMIA model is in the topology model; although, the topology model can also contain components not included in the CMIA model. For example, often ICT components exist on the same network that are unrelated to the mission being modeled. In the case of PoS, a merchant may have other computers that might be used for inventory, customer management, etc. These types of hosts were modeled as ''merchant clients,'' representing a population of hosts that can be used as stepping stones for the attacker.
Developing the defender model
The security engineers who built the PoS testbed, selected a set of security methods to apply to secure the PoS architecture. The intent was a reference architecture to illustrate best practice. Modeling these methods in CSG makes it possible to more dynamically present a reference architecture, since not all organizations will be able to afford the entire set of tools that were selected. Each defense (listed below) was selected for a purpose: Access controls reduce the ability for an unauthorized person to access the PoS Terminals; Encryption ensures that the data elements that must be private are unreadable; Whitelisting of processes on the PoS terminals makes it harder to run a process that could scrape memory looking for customer card data; etc.
The set of defensive methods considered for the PoS system are listed in Table 1 . Each row of the table describes a different method. Each method is implemented by a tool that belongs to a category. Tools in the same category are applied exclusively of each other tools. For example, only one of the Terminal Access Control methods will be used in a portfolio. The cost of employing each tool is represented. The method effectiveness assessments define how well the method works to prevent each cyber effect. Currently these assessments rely on Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). In the future, we would prefer more objective assessments developed by standard bodies who assess and evaluate the effectiveness of cyber security tools, and how they combine.
For this particular PoS system no defense methods were used that involved changes to the PoS process model. However, a second PoS topology model was developed to segment the PoS specific ICT resources into their own subnet within the merchant network. This isolates them from any other merchant ICT resources (merchant workstations) not related to PoS. The topology variation also specifies a diversity in the ICT resources used for the Merchant PoS Clients, and the PoS Server, so that the same exploit cannot be used to subvert both of them.
Decision making with CSG
In this application of CSG we demonstrate how it allows people to make cyber security investment decisions. Since each defense method can reduce the mission systems cyber risk, given an associated employment cost, CSG automatically identifies the optimal portfolio (i.e., combination of defense methods) for any given level of investment. Combining the amount of risk reduction with the costs is the best way to understand one's return on investment (ROI). Figure 11 shows the results of exploring the portfolio options for the PoS system used in our example. A total of 55,296 defense portfolio options were considered. With no defenses the risk score was 8,492,934. With all the security methods applied, the risk was reduced to 2,038,408, for a cost of $250k. However, spending~$39k, the risk can be reduced to 2,779,440. This represents 89% of the risk reduction for only 16% of the cost. Decision makers will use this information to select an optimal portfolio that best meets their needs.
Summary
In this paper, we have described the Cyber Security Game (CSG). CSG is both a method and software that implements the method. MITRE is a USA Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC), and the CMIA and CSG prototypes can be made available to government agencies. CSG implements a quantitative, assessment of a mission system's cyber risk. CSG formalizes a number of information gathering activities that occur during traditional risk assessment into computable artifacts that describe the system (i.e., a system topology model and impact model). CSG algorithmically encapsulates expert level capabilities that leverages these computable artifacts to implement a cyber risk assessment that as a consistent, comprehensive, and repeatable process. Just as importantly, since CSG explicitly captures computational artifacts this make it practical to keep risk assessments up to date as the system or missions change. A defender need only update the appropriate CSG model(s) to reflect changes, and rerun CSG to update the assessment.
At this point, one should not assume that CSG will produce risk scores that are calibrated to reality. There are currently many unknowns, ranging from how effective security methods actually are, to how they complement each other in practice, to whether the capabilities in our simplified attacker model represent the capabilities of real attackers. What CSG brings to the table, however, is the ability to compare relative risk across different system architectures and defense employments given a mission context. It is the relative performance of employing defense methods given their relative costs that drives the best portfolio for a price point. The performance of CSG, however, is only as good as the models it has to work with. If they are incorrect then its output will be incorrect. We recommend that as much time should be spent validating the models to ensure they produce sensible results as is spent building them. Currently they are validated by mission SMEs and by using sensitivity analysis on the model parameters.
CSG supports a more comprehensive cyber security risk analysis than could be performed manually, supporting a rational approach to cyber security decision making. CSG identifies the possible attack paths in actual or possible system topologies. It uses MiniMax search to assess how attacker and defender actions change the system's cyber security risks. Finally, it performs a portfolio analysis to identify optimal risk reduction portfolios. Such computations are challenging for non-experts to perform. Implementing these in a tool form can help to level the playing field for organizations that want to perform risk assessments, by reducing the need for risk assessment specialists and by producing the artifacts that clearly capture the system, mission and assumptions that were used in the assessment. When remediating risks, it is easy for defenders to fixate on specific risks and over invest in defending one portion of the system at the expense of underinvesting in others. CSG combats this by looking across the entire set of components, incidents, and outcomes. It apportions defenses to reduce the risks systematically. Each step in the game tries to best reduce the risks existing at that point in the game, while using look-ahead to avoid making a locally greedy decision. Each defender move may then cause other component(s) to have the largest payoff for an attacker. Therefore, CSG can answer important cyber security questions such as, ''how much decoy data is enough?'' CSG answers this by being able to apportion decoy data until the best attacker move becomes one that attacks components not being protected by the decoys. At that point, in a game theoretic sense, additional deployment of decoys is wasted given that the attacker already has a higher payoff elsewhere. By exploring the game-tree, CSG portfolios are always balanced to reduce overall risk. In this paper, we have demonstrated how CSG can be used to prescriptively identify which defense methods are best used and where they should be used. When used with a decision target (i.e., reduce the risk by 70%) or a cost threshold (i.e., how much money to spend), CSG can be used to determine whether the set of defense methods achieve that target, and to identify the optimal combination of defenses. If there is no a priori decision target, CSG can also be used to perform an entire portfolio analysis. This makes it possible to identify the optimal set of defenses to use at each given price point, and to understand if and when there is a diminishing return on their investment. We demonstrated this capability using a Point of Sale System.
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